17
600
The Import Trade.-The following statemont, abstracted from the Official Returns, shows the position of the Colony as a market for British and European goods since 1890, in thousands of pounds sterling
F
1898-1900. 1901-1905. 1906-1910.
1911,
1912.
1912
£
£
£
£
£
From United Kingdom
2,981
8,752
4,012
4,694
5,380
6,064
12.
Continent of Europe and
1,553
2,314
2,208
2,415
3,144
3,679
United States.
British Excess
F,428
1,138
1,804
2,279
2,236
2,385
Percentages of Total.
United Kingdom
65.7
61-9
64.5
66
63-1
62-2
Continent of Europe and United
Stater.
34-3
38.1
35.5
31
36-9
37-8
It will be noted that not only does Great Britain control the major portion of the trade, but she is maintaining her relative position, and has secured a full share of the increased business of recent years.
The principal imports from Great Britain are cotton textiles, machinery, and metals.
The Export Trade in Produce. The exports from the Colony during the year 1913 were divided as follows:-
To United Kingdom
11
British Possessions
"
Foreign Countries
-
Total
£
10,745,000
14,117,000
20,513,000
45,375,000
It will be seen that the United Kingdom takes a considerable share of the exports of produce, but does not hold the same predominant position as in the import trade. The shipments to the United States of the two staple products of the Malay Peninsula, viz., tin and rubber, exceed those to the United Kingdom; and as the principal markets for copra are Marseilles, Hamburg, and Copenhagen, this trade is largely in the hands of German and Danish firms.
German Competition. To obtain an accurate idea of the trend and strength of German competition, it is necessary to consider it under three distinct heads :-
(1) The competition as a country supplying manufactured articles to the Straits
and receiving produce in exchange;
(2) The competition of local German merchant firms in Singapore and Penang
with the British houses for the trade of the Colony; and
(3) The competition (or rather the privileged position) of the German lines in
the shipping services radiating from Singapore.
As a supplier of manufactured articles to the Straits, and as a consumer of Straits produce, Germany takes a very low place, and her competition is not serious. Inasmuch as many of the German shipments are made through Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Genoa, it is practically impossible to secure exact figures of the trade. In 1913, however, the direct imports from Germany and Austria amounted to less than 2 per cent. of the total imports, while the exports of produce to those countries were approximately 5 per cent. of the total. Great efforts were being made before the war to stimulate the export of produce to the Central Empires, and this would doubtless have been reflected before long in increased imports of manufactured goods.
The competition of local German firms in Singapore and Penang was, however, a much more serious factor, and they were becoming keen rivals of the British houses in the buying of produce and in the distribution of imported articles. The principal local firm, with brauches all through the islands, was Behn, Meyer & Co., the agents for the Norddeutscher Lloyd, who controlled the steamers not only to Bangkok but also to British North Borneo and certain of the Dutch islands. This was the only
firm of high standing, but there were also many other smaller houses, usually offshoots of the larger company, who were doing an increasing trade in produce aud also in the distribution of British and Continental imports.
The reasons for the success of the German merchants were :-
(a) The fact that many of the steamship services from Singapore, notably to Siam and Borneo, were run by German firms. The result was that the rice trade from Bangkok fell into their hands, and the return cargoes of piece goods and sundries were largely supplied by them. These advantages were reinforced by the secret rebates allowed to German shippers by the German Conference lines.
(6) The more prominent of the German merchants established branches in Java and the Dutch islands, the Philippines, Siam, and the other com- mercial dependencies of Singapore, and they endeavoured to tap a certain amount of the trade at the source instead of buying from and selling to native dealers in Singapore. It is doubtful whether this policy of decentralisation would in the long run have proved a success, owing to the probable hostility of the native merchants.
(e) These branches throughout the islands, however, gave them considerable experience of local conditions and increased their value as distributors, with the result that many valuable agencies of British manufacturers | were granted to enemy firms.
(d) In order to secure the trade in staple imports, such as piece goods, against their old-established British rivals, the German merchants were less strict in insisting on payments for goods, and gave extended credits. This probably increased their proportion of bad debts and so reduced their margins, but, as a rule, being desirous of working their way into a lucrative trade, they were prepared to sacrifice the profit in order to secure the large turnover.
(e) There is little doubt that the average German assistant worked longer hours and applied himself to more laborious tasks than his British competitor. For evidence of this one has only to study the articles in which they competed the most keenly, and it will almost invariably be found that they commenced by developing the trade in fancy piece goods and sundries, which are sold in small lots, and entail a great amount of troublesome detail work in proportion to the value of the orders. The British assistant, on the other hand, as a rule prefers to confine his attention to the large staple lines, which give a maximum turnover for a minimum of detail. It may be contended that this is only natural, and that we can afford to allow our competitors to secure the less lucrative and more laborious branches of the trade, but it should be borne in mind that, having once secured a native connection for the fancy trade, it is a much easier matter to develop a staple trade, and there is little doubt that German houses would in the future have become keener competitors in the standard articles of import.
The German houses were securing a stronger hold on the produce export trade, inasmuch as many of the articles of export are consumed on the Continent rather than in Great Britain, and the German was more conversant than his British rival with the requirements of the European market and the peculiar needs of the buyers.
While, it is true, the most lucrative portion of the trade was secured, before the war, by the British houses, the fact remains that they were beginning to feel the effect of the German competition, which was, each year, becoming more serious. The outbreak of war, however, put a complete check ou enemy activities. The German members of the community were interned, their businesses were compulsorily liquidated, and many of their assets have been sold. There appears to be little doubt that the leading firm of Behn, Meyer & Co. were in very close touch with the Imperial Authorities in Germany, who encouraged their schemes for pacific penetration. The senior partner of the firm in Singapore-Herr Diehn-escaped at the time of the Sepoy mutiny last year, and the extent of the influence which had been secured by his firm is reflected by their representation on the boards of any of the most important local institutions, particularly the Tanjong Pagar Dock Board, which is the official Harbour and Dock Board of Singapore. The danger of allowing a potential enemy subject to become a member of such an institution in a great Imperial coaliug station and
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